US Army War College

USAWC Press
Monographs, Books, and Publications
2-1-2010

Do Oil Exports Fuel Defense Spending?
Clayton K. S. Chun Dr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs

Recommended Citation
Chun, Clayton K. S. Dr., "Do Oil Exports Fuel Defense Spending?" (2010). Monographs, Books, and
Publications. 607.
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/607

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Monographs, Books, and Publications by an authorized administrator of USAWC Press.

STRATEGIC
STUDIES
INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War College and
is the strategic level study agent for issues related to national security and
military strategy with emphasis on geostrategic analysis.
The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct strategic
studies that develop policy recommendations on:
• Strategy, planning and policy for joint and combined
employment of military forces;
• Regional strategic appraisals;
• The nature of land warfare;
• Matters affecting the Army’s future;
• The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and
• Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army.
Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern topics having
strategic implications for the Army, the Department of Defense, and the
larger national security community.
In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topics of special
or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings of conferences and
topically-orientated roundtables, expanded trip reports, and quick reaction
responses to senior Army leaders.
The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the Army
to address strategic and other issues in support of Army participation in
national security policy formulation.

DO OIL EXPORTS FUEL DEFENSE SPENDING?

Clayton K. S. Chun
February 2010

Visit our website for other free publication
downloads
http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/
To rate this publication click here.
The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department
of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications enjoy
full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified
information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent
official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to
offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest
of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for public
release; distribution is unlimited.
*****
This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code,
Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be
copyrighted.

*****
Comments pertaining to this report are invited and
should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave,
Carlisle, PA 17013-5244.
*****
All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications
are available on the SSI homepage for electronic
dissemination. Hard copies of this report may also be
ordered from our homepage. SSI’s homepage address
is: www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.
*****
The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly
e-mail newsletter to update the national security
community on the research of our analysts, recent and
forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences
sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also
provides a strategic commentary by one of our
research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this
newsletter, please subscribe on our homepage at www.
StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter/.

ISBN 1-58487-420-1

ii

FOREWORD
Economic power allows nations to influence events
within and outside their borders. In today’s globalized
world, many countries that export manufactured
goods, provide services, supply financial credit, and
control vital raw materials have the ability to
significantly affect their economic well-being. Those
countries can wield their financial resources to improve
the condition of their citizens and neighbors or threaten
a region through the development of a large military
or security capability. Oil is the lifeblood of the world
economy. For the past decades, oil-exporting countries
have experienced great economic gains due to the
world’s hunger for petroleum. Undoubtedly, oil profits
allow some nations to acquire advanced weapons
systems or develop internal security programs. When
economic conditions worsen and oil revenues fall, logic
argues that with reduced profits defense spending
should shrink.
This monograph explores the impact that oil
revenue had on the national defense spending of five
oil-exporting countries. Despite periods of falling
oil revenues, these countries typically did not lower
defense spending. In some cases, defense spending
increased sharply, or the rate of decrease was much
lower than the drop in oil revenues. This condition
creates challenges for national security professionals.
If nations face falling oil revenues and still have the
will and ability to expand their military or security
capabilities, then they might do so through the
sacrifice of domestic spending or regional stability.
Economic sanctions, worldwide recession, or falling oil
demand may not stop these oil-exporting nations from
purchasing weapons and creating large security forces.
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Although oil might have been a key to provide past or
future earnings expectations to fund defense, perhaps
there are other reasons why nations want relatively high
defense spending levels despite lower oil revenue. The
politics of oil and its impact on government control,
regional threats, national interests, and other strategic
factors may explain why these nations pursue defense
spending despite falling oil revenue.
Policies that attempt to limit oil revenues of potential
enemies alone may not be sufficient to inhibit them
from creating regional instability through expansion of
their defense capabilities. Hopes for reduced defense
expenditures, by countries like Iran, as a result of a
drop in energy demand seem to be diminished by these
findings. A more complex picture emerges that forces
analysts and policymakers to search more broadly for
options to stem potential arms races that may be fueled
by the riches of oil-exporting countries.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Many national security analysts have viewed oilexporting countries with some trepidation. Although
these exporting nations supply a vital energy source
to the United States and her allies, it comes at a
price. A great wealth transfer occurs in this process
from oil importers to exporters. In some cases, oil
importers face economic woes if energy prices rise
sharply. Additionally, some critics might argue that
oil exporters now have the financial wherewithal
to acquire a military capability that could threaten
neighbors or create intra-regional instability with
global implications. If oil revenues are the major factor
that determines defense spending levels, then an oilexporting nation’s neighbors or other powers need to
become more vigilant during times of great energy
demand or price increases. Conversely, decreases
in oil revenue might presage a reduction in defense
spending and a corresponding lessening of tensions.
Could oil prices be a significant factor in determining
defense spending? If so, then the level of oil revenue
may become an important predictor for future defense
budgets. But what if nations decide their defense
spending will be independent of oil revenues? A more
serious situation might ensue if defense spending rises
independently of any oil price increase or decrease.
During the summer of 2008, oil exporters received
record oil profits. Oil importers suffered greatly due to
the high energy prices. As the world economy retreated
in early 2009, some national security analysts believed
that the United States might face fewer problems from
oil exporters that bankrolled their defense spending
through petroleum sales. Although the premise that
falling oil prices would cause a reduction of government
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expenditures seems attractive, perhaps it might not be
valid.
Nations that depend on oil sales or raw materials
for their major source of government revenue might
act much differently from industrialized or developed
countries. States that rely on rents from the sale of
their raw materials, leases from firms extracting raw
materials, royalties, and other payments have motives
to control these raw materials. Such rentier economies
may have few options to develop wealth other than
from raw materials extraction. The governments that
oversee these economies could use these revenues to
placate or silence critics, create a society that depends
on government largesse, or divert profits for the
personal enrichment of government officials. If the
economy is not fully developed, then the government
might be the major source of economic strength and
power in the state. The national leadership may feel
the need to control the sale of raw materials, like oil, to
maintain its position in society. Government officials
who control all aspects of the economy, politics, and
society may employ this wealth to underwrite large
defense budgets to enhance their own security or to
create a capability to counter a national security threat.
Oil revenues and wealth serve as means to finance
current and future defense spending. One method to
indicate how defense spending changes with different
amounts of oil revenue is simply to measure elasticity
of demand. This metric describes the sensitivity of
defense spending to changes in oil revenue in a given
period. If, during a given period, a nation’s defense
spending rises or falls by a greater percentage than
the percentage rise or fall respectively of oil revenue
receipts, then defense spending is said to be elastic.
Conversely, if during the same period a nation’s defense
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spending rises or falls by a lower percentage than
the percentage rise or fall respectively of oil revenue
receipts, then defense spending is said to be insensitive
to oil revenues, or inelastic. The most extreme and
threatening form of defense spending inelasticity in a
potential aggressor nation occurs, of course, during a
period when the percentage rate of defense spending is
trending upward at the same time that the percentage
rate of oil revenues is trending downward. That could
be a very troubling sign in regions afflicted by rivalries.
This monograph examines five countries that relied
on oil exportation for a large portion of their Gross
Domestic Product (GDP)—Venezuela, Iran, Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, and Nigeria. Each nation exhibited a
mainly inelastic demand for defense spending vis-à-vis
oil exporting revenues. This suggests that oil revenue
is only one factor in determining why nations might
have a high rate of defense spending. These countries
increased defense spending even during times of
declining oil revenues.
Each nation experienced situations where annual
oil revenue decreases failed to slow defense spending,
and there were years when defense expenditures
actually increased. Additionally, in countries that did
not decrease defense budgets at the same rate of oil
revenue reductions, military expenditures fared better.
However, in some instances, worldwide economic
slowdowns did cause reductions in defense spending,
but this condition was temporary and not universal to
all oil exporters.
If oil revenue is not the major determinant of
defense spending, then what other factors could affect
such spending? Nations might rely on many years of oil
revenue accumulation to disburse during lean times.
Long-term defense systems like aircraft or ballistic
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missiles might require many years to acquire. Securityconscious countries might fear the growth of a regional
rival, domestic opposition, terrorism, or other threats
that require military forces regardless of the level of oil
revenues. To explain why defense spending increases
or decreases, analysts would need to consider countryspecific rationales rather than concentrating solely on
oil revenue measures. Policies that attempt to limit oil
revenues for nations that potentially endanger national
interests may not significantly affect defense spending.
Thus, a one-size-fits-all policy would probably fail;
instead, mitigating regional threats or pursuing other
options to reduce the defense spending of the target
state might be more successful.
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DO OIL EXPORTS FUEL DEFENSE SPENDING?
In the summer of 2008, American and other
energy importers faced a global economic crisis as
spot crude oil prices reached record highs. With oil
prices exceeding $147 a barrel, oil exporters extracted
enormous additional profit from their valuable
petroleum commodity. These countries gained not
only financial resources, but strengthened influence
that frightened many consuming nations. Energydependent importers had no option but to pay higher
prices, and oil exporters received a windfall economic
boost. This wealth transfer caused other concerns. The
increased energy prices forced Americans to change
their lifestyles. Transportation costs rose, and firms had
to raise prices of products despite the current economic
troubles. The economy suffered from reduced demand
for airline travel, manufacturing production reductions, and consumer hardship that worsened the crisis.
The rising dependence on foreign oil supplies also
created problems that threatened America’s national
security in other areas. Rising oil prices have allegedly
emboldened certain nations to pursue adventurism
throughout their regions. Oil-exporting countries flush
with export revenue could use these funds to purchase
weapons, provide aid to unfriendly organizations or
groups, or finance terrorist activities within the region.
Additionally, high oil prices provide governments with
resources to spend lavishly on social programs for the
public or expand domestic security capabilities to prop
up their own authoritarian governments. Limited oil
markets can also influence relations between nations.
Oil producers might sway American allies to support
positions or remain neutral on certain issues with
the promise of an uninterrupted petroleum supply,
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a reduced price, or subsidy for their allegiance. Such
action is especially effective during times of rising oil
prices and limited supplies. Similarly, oil profits may
allow nations to fund weapons development, like Iran’s
nuclear programs, and expand military capabilities
that cause global concerns.
While prices for gasoline, heating oil, and other
petroleum-based products reached worldwide record
highs, another economic crisis was brewing. Financial institutions started to fail due to a toxic mixture
of subprime home mortgage foreclosures, questionable financial credit policies, bankruptcies, and failing
economies. These actions culminated in a global
economic slowdown. Rising energy prices may
have significantly contributed to this slowdown.
Unemployment rose, consumer spending spiraled
downward, banks and financial lending institutions
froze credit, firms laid off employees, automobile
companies were forced to the brink of bankruptcy, and
banks failed. The U.S. Government provided massive
aid to banks to avert a financial meltdown. Demand
started to ebb for oil. Oil prices started a precipitous
fall. By the day after Christmas 2008, oil prices had
fallen to about $33 a barrel. Some experts believed that
the reduced oil prices and “declining revenues [would]
put a squeeze on the adventurism of producers like Iran
and Venezuela.”1 Rising oil prices were the catalyst for
actions that would harm American national interests.
If oil prices fell, then export revenues would deflate
and limit this harmful behavior, or so it was thought.
Lower oil prices would induce petroleum-exporting
countries to cut defense spending along with other
government outlays. This action would lower tensions
among regional rivals and forestall potential crises
involving the United States. This putative linkage
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between economic health and spending on activities
that include foreign policy actions, aid to other
nations, and defense spending would have profound
implications for the United States, if true.
The erratic movement of oil prices creates serious
impacts on world consumers and petroleum-exporting
countries. Rising oil prices may lead to inflation,
unemployment, limited economic opportunities,
slowed trade, and other problems for consumers.
The same rising oil prices are a valuable asset for
oil-exporting countries. Some countries became rich
overnight and used their new wealth to increase
government funded programs. Oil revenues provided
a broad avenue toward economic growth. This growth
may be uneven since oil revenue may be under the
control of government, private enterprises, the public,
or some combination of the three. Competition may
become a source of conflict over the control of oil.
Typically, governments balance the competition
for resources among investments for future economic
growth, socio-economic programs, and military
spending.2 The tension between these demands and
available resources provides a challenge for most
governments. Nations that rely on raw materials
extraction and exports face a greater test. Industrialized
and developed nations have diversified and mature
markets that can compensate for economic downturns
in particular segments of the economy or problems in
the capital markets. However, problems exist for oil
exporters. In an economy dominated by oil, economic
downturns in the energy market can bankrupt the
government unless it can find alternative financing or
fall back on national savings. Conversly, oil revenues
can rise during global economic expansion or through
shortages caused by economic embargos, production
limitations, or natural disasters that limit oil supply.
3

Rising oil prices facilitate the acquisition of greater
resources and perhaps economic development. But
oil revenues can also drive a government to finance
massive military equipment purchases like Saudi
Arabia did in 1979.3 The nature of governments that rely
on raw material extraction and long-term development
of military programs may affect how their current
and future spending occurs regardless of oil prices.
How nations decide to use their national wealth helps
explain some of the perennial problems facing oil and
commodity exporting nations and provides insights
into their relations with other countries.
Falling oil prices might cause governments of those
states whose economies rely heavily on petroleum
exports to reduce defense budgets. Some oil experts
speculate that falling prices affect the producer's
behavior and they will act to reduce their propensity
to spend on discretionary government activities like
defense spending. In this view, oil revenues are linked
to the ability to pay for discretionary defense and
other programs. They also speculate that reduced oil
prices in turn will change how major nations act.4 The
implication is that these nations will reduce their defense programs because their ability to pay is lowered,
and this condition will then allow the United States to
limit its defense budget safely. However, such speculation might not pan out. Countervailing considerations may also influence defense spending patterns.
Strategic demands, national objectives, regional threats,
and other interests of producers may force increased
defense spending despite reductions in the primary
source of national revenue. With regard to our five
selected countries that depend on oil exports to fuel their
economies, do rising oil prices create conditions where
defense budgets increase? Similarly, would falling oil
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prices also predict cuts in defense budgets? Certainly
large oil revenues help create conditions that can lead
to increased spending on government programs. The
same can be said for threats that may drain reserves
created from past oil sales, forcing oil producers to seek
credit. Oil may even play a large role in determining
the nature of government itself. Resource-extracting
countries could find their wealth concentrated in
the hands of an oligarchic few in government to the
public’s detriment. Defense and security spending
may be linked to a felt need to maintain the internal
status quo rather than pursuing external adventures in
the region or beyond.
RENTIER ECONOMIES AND OIL
International trade involves a host of complex
relationships and mechanisms to facilitate the exchange
of manufactured goods and services. Most countries
now conduct business transactions globally. Despite
differences in foreign exchange, cultures, laws, and
product standards, businesses find common ground
to purchase finished goods, acquire commodities,
receive services, transfer financial capital, and obtain
technology. Widespread economic globalization has
boosted the world’s income level and distribution
of wealth, albeit with some concerns along the way.
Broadened economic activity has required firms to
produce additional finished products to sell abroad and
to a wider domestic market. Marketable manufactured
products require a vast amount or raw materials,
including oil. Additionally, sea, ground, and air transportation of products and raw materials needs oil.
Developing countries that have garnered economic
gains from trade also face demands for higher stan-
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dards of living among their publics. Citizens want
better nutrition, access to consumer goods, transportation, and a host of other benefits that require energy and
a larger share of corporation and government revenue,
whether from a tax-based redistribution of wealth
or from direct profits from state-owned enterprises.
Greater demand for energy in developed and
growing economies like those of China and India has
pushed petroleum exploration, drilling, production,
and shipping to new heights. Citizens in these developing nations demand energy in the form of transportation, utilities, goods, services, and infrastructure. China
has aggressively sought increased and better secured
oil and natural gas sources. In 1997, daily world oil
production averaged 72,231 barrels. By 2007, expanded
state-owned and private petroleum enterprise efforts
to find new oil reserves, extend drilling, and improve
distribution pushed daily production levels to 81,659
barrels.5 A few exporting countries process the oil into
refined gasoline or provide some value added service
to enhance the raw material, but many do nothing but
extract it and sell the raw oil to a buyer. Unfortunately,
states that sell oil as a commodity do not benefit
financially from the value-added processing of oil into
usable energy or derivative products like plastic.
The large oil-producing countries earn most of
their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) through the direct
sale of oil. For example, 90 percent of Saudi Arabia’s
GDP derives from petroleum-related activities.6
Iran receives 80 percent of its GDP from petroleum
products. However, Iran has more diversification in
its economy, which includes some agriculture and
manufacturing. Still, such oil-producing nations must
rely largely on oil sales to foreign countries to sustain
their economies. They receive rent for the use of their
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natural resource from purchasers. This rent may
take the form of royalities paid for offshore drilling,
leaseholds for access to oil-rich properties, or long- or
short-term production contracts.
If nations use the rents to improve and diversify
their economies, they may not be subject to wide
swings in the demand for energy or the damaging
effects of a worldwide economic depression. Typically,
the oil-producing government controls either the stateowned enterprise that sells and distributes the oil, or it
sells the leaseholds or mineral rights to international
oil companies. The government then collects the rents
and distributes them through government activities,
income programs, jobs, or contracts. Some countries
have democratic governments, giving the public a
voice in the distribution of these rents. Other oilproducing nations’ populations do not have direct
popular input. Some rentier economies do very well
in oil sales, receiving sufficient funds through direct
sales or royalties to obviate taxation of their citizenry
to operate the government. But without domestic taxation, political intercourse within a state can atrophy as
the citizenry provides tacit consent to the government
to make decisions independently of public debate in
exchange for its meeting their social welfare needs.7 If
oil revenue falls, this tacit contract might be broken,
with popular discontent resulting.
For example, post-Cold War Russian economic
growth was stymied as that nation converted from
a centrally controlled to a free market system. One
advantage the Russian economy did possess was
abundant natural resources. These raw materials
seemed a poor second to manufacturing because
of difficulty in accessing them. But global energy
demand, outside capital, trained labor, technology,
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and increased access to Russian raw materials by
Western corporations opened the energy sector to
rapid development.
Fueled by rising global energy prices, the Russian
economy grew. Several Russian energy firm owners
became instant tycoons. However, immense oil and
natural gas profits motivated Russian government
officials to take control of private energy enterprises.
With these economic engines under his control,
President Vladimir Putin was able to singlehandedly
control and change many of Russia’s institutions and
policies, while circumventing democratic instititions
and processes. Putin’s drive to build a resurgent
nationalistic Russia was based on his ability to
improve the standard of living of the public. Incomes
rose, goods and services flowed into the country,
and nationalism flourished, all due to oil revenues.
These revenues allowed Putin to convince Russia’s
elites to follow his policies, bribe the population,
and deter protest in exchange for authoritarian rule.8
The Russian public’s discontent over accusations of
corruption, infringements of democracy, and other
issues was muted as long as the standard of living rose
every year. Contractions in the global economy forced
reductions in the demand for imported products
and services, including oil. Falling oil revenue has
endangered the ability of the government to meet
the expectation of a continuing rise in the standard of
living for Russian citizens. This development could
have serious repercussions for Russia and the West.
These governments face a quandary on whether to
continue to fund social welfare programs, economic
development, or defense. Governments that do not
have public support or that face external threats
may have to sacrifice domestic spending to maintain
defense budgets. Conversely, if the nation chooses to
8

spend additional funds on defense, then it may face
rising public discontent that could require higher
current and future defense spending regardless of
oil revenues. In the case of Russia, more government
control over businesses and consolidation of political
power may result.
Countries that depend on raw material extraction
and that do not have the requisite technology, financing, or skilled labor may be forced to accept foreign
corporate intervention to exploit their resources.
Given the profits and resources at stake, corruption in
the award of lucrative contracts is a potential concern
regarding the selection and continued natural resource
extraction from developing nations. Oil is a particularly
sensitive material since it commands high levels of
sustained revenue streams for its producers.
Some developing countries that export oil are
susceptible to authoritarian rule. The reliance on oil
as a major revenue source may even drive countries
to limit efforts to introduce democratization into their
states. One study examined three causes. First, some
nations may use oil revenues to ensure that their
particular governments and leaders preserve their
positions. Middle Eastern, African, and Southeast
Asian nations that export oil can use control over the
distribution of resource wealth to block democratic
aspirations of the population, thus assuring that the
current government stays in power. These countries
may spend excessively on defense or security measures
since resource wealth may lead to ethnic or regional
conflict over its division.9 Second, governments
may limit certain types of valuable programs such
as education. Vocational training and limited basic
educational programs might supplant higherlevel educational systems that encourage political
reflection and activity, thus fostering unfettered
9

discussion and potential opposition to government
policies. By controlling education levels, economic
development, and other culural changes, countries
may try to limit any intellectual or social catalysts
that encourage democratization. These countries
spend their petroleum wealth on programs that may
indirectly slow the development of democracy while
bolstering the current political order. This move may
also further arrest development that would diversify
the economy and shield the nation from economic
turmoil if oil revenues fell. Third, the rentier, or landlord, economies that bring great wealth may affect
the behavior of their governments. Governments of
such states may spend oil profits on the population in
exchange for less public demand for transparency or
accountability for their actions.10 The government may
opt to provide lavish job programs or provide generous
income to its citizenry through subsidized jobs or a
paid stipend from oil sales in hopes of placating any
political opposition. Other rationales for these actions
might include patronage and the use of resources by
the government to forestall the creation of political
opposition groups.
Some oil revenue might be linked to desires to
underwrite regional or global aims, or the increased
defense spending borne by the state could be directed
towards internal or domestic initiatives. Construction
of ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), or other high-impact weapons certainly poses
threats to neighbors. Such capabilities also serve as
a source of national pride and may provide a more
satisfactory view of the government by its public,
especially if there is a perceived national threat.
Iran’s building of a ballistic missile force and nuclear
program helped provide a deterrent against Saddam
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Hussein and now demonstrates a potential capability
to destroy another hated foe, Israel. Moreover, such
weapons bolster the Islamic state in its determination to
stand up to pressures from the United States and other
western countries. A nuclear-capable Iran can also
threaten other regional states and perhaps influence
their behavior in preferred ways. Such behavior could
include tacit acquiescence in Iran’s ambition to exercise
political influence throughout the Middle East.
Government control of natural resources might take
the shape of state-controlled enterprises or the sale or
lease of oil drilling rights that may limit transparency
in the use of any profits, taxes, and payments from
commercial oil companies. Centrally controlled
use of resources might not ensure their efficient or
effective use. Development could concentrate on the
oil industry, which is reliant on capital-intensive labor,
often in short supply. Many nations that rely primarily
on mineral extraction tend not to develop industries
beyond drilling, storage, shipment, and others
narrowly associated with the resource in question.
This tendency limits economic development and can
foster resentment among citizens who are unemployed
as a result. This situation could in turn require the
government to deal with greater security demands. This
vicious cycle of resource demand would necessitate
greater control of oil by the government and further
limit political reform. Ad hoc dissident groups could
target the oil industry to reduce the government’s antireform leverage. Government retaliation might in turn
drive the dissidents to seize control of oil facilities or
obstruct its extraction, transportation, or processing.
Nations of whatever level of development might
expand their military expenditures based on ambition,
fear, or legitimacy.11 Instead of increasing domestic
spending and thus maintaining their positions and
11

status within exisiting governments, leaders may
choose to expand defense spending for strong countervailing reasons. As we have seen, nations with various
kinds of economies may increase their military spending whether there is an increase in national income or
not. Nations may feel the need to have a greater military
capability in order to underwrite a more aggressive
foreign policy. Instead of relying on negotiation and
diplomacy, which may have not yielded a hoped-for
outcome, a government might use its military to gain
its goal forcibly.
These nations could also fear a neighbor or anticipate a regional conflict that would fuel an arms race.
If one country builds a military capability proficient
enough to invade or strike a nearby state, then the
threatened state may need to build an air defense
system, purchase antitank weapons, or obtain other
capabilities to repel the aggressor’s potential moves.
Fear can drive the government to justify large
and extended defense expenditures regardless of
inadequate oil revenue.
Oil-exporting nations may also use their wealth to
build a military and fund an international venture in
the hope that it will divert the attention of domestic
critics. These countries can use their oil revenues to
pay for conventional military forces, internal security,
or subsidies for extremist and terrorist groups that
operate outside their borders. Governments may
use nationalistic pleas to win public support for the
country’s foreign policy agenda. If the government
can gain initial public support, then it can use this
opportunity to strengthen its legitimacy in the eyes of
its citizenry and thus maintain its position.
Although economic growth offers the means
to expand defense spending, the rationale for such
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spending needs more detailed analysis. Defense
spending may include projects that require long-term
funding commitments. Ministries of defense might
plan for replacements of their air defense interceptor
or naval ship building activities that require years
to negotiate, design, develop, build, and deploy.
The commitment to acquire these programs occurs
regardless of oil revenue flow. In 2009, oil revenues
dropped for many petroleum-producing countries.
These countries still chose to maintain and, in some
cases increase, military spending due to long-term
purchases of complex systems and regional instability
threatening their security.12 The major source of
apprehension among some of some Middle Eastern oil
producers is Iran with its expanding military capability,
especially its suspected nuclear weapons programs,
delivery systems, willingness to fund and aid radical
Islamic groups, capability to wage a conventional land
campaign against neighbors, and ability to obstruct oil
tanker traffic in the Persian Gulf.
MEASURING OIL’S EFFECT ON DEFENSE
SPENDING
During periods of rising oil prices, nations heavily
reliant on oil exports will see the GDP spiral quickly
to great levels, given the size of the export market and
demand by consumers. For oil-dependent countries,
the demand for petroleum leaves little room to
negotiate changes to any short-term prices or orders
for oil. World oil demand and limited production
forces nations to pay the current or “spot” price. Oil
is largely a fungible resource for which sellers can
immediately seek the highest offered price regardless
of prior agreements. Although oil-importing
countries can adjust lifestyles, seek new energy
13

sources, introduce new technologies, and undertake
other measures, these actions take years and require
difficult living and cultural adjustments. Particularly,
some economies may attempt to conserve energy,
but certain activities, such as driving automobiles,
require extensive behavioral changes or technologies
to improve automobile mileage standards, but these
actions take time. Oil demand may be very insensitive
to price changes, that is, inelastic, over a short period
of time (more on this subject later). Despite huge oil
price spikes, individuals and governments might not
change their oil consumption behavior.
An oil producer may face a fall in demand due
to weakening economic conditions or rivals who are
expanding their oil exports to advance their market
share. The rivals can advertise below-market prices to
entice customers. When prices fall, these oil producers
might attempt to compensate for the fall in prices by
increasing the volume of oil sold. These activities may
also further depress oil prices through a round of price
cuts used to undersell competitiors, which will force a
continued increase of production and decrease in price.
Falling oil prices could signal a forced rentrenchment
of government spending cuts, including defense.
Social demands for improved health care, income
redistribution, jobs programs, and other domestic
activities to ameliorate economic concerns may force
defense spending and other discretionary spending
to take a back seat in their budgetary share. Oil price
reductions have forced Venezuela’s President Hugo
Chavez to reevaluate government spending. Chavez
used spending on social programs to bolster his
government and maintain power. Despite the desire to
maintain welfare and social spending, he announced
that budgeted spending will fall by 6.7 percent
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in 2009.13 Reduced oil prices, falling production,
inflationary pressures due to government mandated
increases in minimum wages, lack of foreign exchange
reserves, and limited access to credit markets have
forced painful cuts in many governments’ budgets and
created the potential for long-term economic problems.
Of course, such a situation could have a bright side.
If raw material prices fall, then a situation might arise
where the people shout for the creation of democratic
insititutions to better serve their interests.
There are many challenges in determining whether
oil prices and revenues can influence certain exporting
countries’ foreign and domestic policies. Measuring
whether oil revenues have an impact on defense
spending over the course of a year may provide only
a snapshot in time. A change in government, regional
problems, or other developments might obscure the
long-term pattern of behavior towards defense
spending. A nation could have faced unusual conditions that affected their decisions on defense spending
independently of oil revenues. Similarly, defense
spending to improve particular capabilities may require
years to take full effect. Acquisition programs to build a
ballistic missile, develop nuclear capabilities, or launch
a satellite require long periods of research, development, and operationalization. A longitudinal study
that compares changes in a nation’s oil revenues during
bust and boom periods can help determine whether
defense spending is affected by such acquisition
programs. Additionally, a direct comparison between nations may be obscured or distorted by the
scale of oil revenues or the use of different monetary
units. Fortunately, most international oil traders still
transact business in a common currency, the U.S.
dollar.
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As we learned in any introductory economics
course, economists frequently try to measure the effect
of one action on another. Recall, for example, that
economists evaluate how changes of a product’s price
can influence consumers’ demand for that product.
Normally, there is an inverse relationship: if the price
of an item falls, the demand for the item increases.
With regard to price vis-à-vis the demand for a typical
good, product, or service, the public would normally
demand more of the item if the price decreases. For
example, if gasoline prices fall, assuming all other
relevant conditions remain the same (e.g., income
levels stay constant), then the public should demand
more gasoline. The totally defined relationship
between these variables provides some evidence of
causality or its absence. Obviously, not all relationships
are inverse: if income rises, then demand for a good
or service usually also rises. Incomes from a nation’s
economic activities are reflected in its GDP. Rentier
economies earn their incomes through the sale of raw
materials or through royalties from leaseholds. We can
normally expect their oil revenue to have a positive
relationship to government spending, especially
defense expenditures, but such is not always the case.
One can study the impact of oil revenues on
defense spending by using a known economic
measure, elasticity. Elasticity allows one to assess how
responsive the change in defense spending is relative
to changes in oil revenues. One can compare oil
revenue changes to the demand in defense spending
to see if oil sales primarily affect government actions.
This does not necessarily imply causation, but some
relationships may provide insight into government
motivations and behavior. In the case of major oil
producers, revenues for government come primarily
from petroleum extraction and sales, whether past,
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present, or projected. The government could use
current export earnings for expenditures on defense, it
could use past earnings to fund current activities, or it
could borrow funds based on potential sales or leases.
The oil revenue elasticity of defense spending
measures the percentage change in defense spending
compared to the petroleum receipts from oil exports
during a given period. The measure of elasticity
gauges how a 1-percentage point change in one
variable affects the percentage change in the targeted
variable. The change of the targeted variable could be
greater, less than, or equal to 1-percentage point. A
small increase in oil revenues may be related to a much
larger increase in defense spending or the reverse. An
increase in one variable may result in either a positive
or inverse relationship. For example, the relationship
between changes in oil revenue and defense spending
may be positive, with both increasing. In this situation,
oil revenue provides a means to buy more arms.
Conversely, the relationship between increased rates
for oil sales and certain types of spending might be
negative, with other types of spending declining. In
still another case, oil revenue spending on a particular
government program might reflect the same percentage rate increase or decrease as in a country’s defense
spending.
Oil revenues are income for a state with a rentier
economy, determining the state’s ability to purchase
the wherewithal for national defense. If defense
spending rises or falls in a positive relationship with
oil revenues, then the relationship should approach an
elastic one. As oil revenues expand, defense spending
should increase more than the change in oil export
sales. This relationship implies fundamentally that the
scale of defense or military expenditures depends on
the health of the oil market. If the relationship is
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anything other than elastic, then further research is
required to explain the direction of defense spending
increases or decreases. Nations that retain the same
or greater defense spending level despite reduced oil
revenues may indicate that for them oil export sales
have little or no relationship to defense spending.
Perhaps a much weaker correlation defines the
relationship.
Oil revenues change due to limited supplies,
increased use by consumers, supply disruptions,
global economic conditions, environmental concerns,
technology, and consumer behavioral changes.14 Since
oil prices fluctuate daily, governments have limited
control over their oil revenue unless those governments
can order the release of large oil volumes on the market
to compensate for the drop in price. These countries
may have large reserves of oil, untapped production
capacity, or stored oil that they are willing to release at
a later date. Some countries belong to the Organization
of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC), a cartel,
which attempts to control worldwide oil markets by
creating artificial global limits in production for member countries that will enable the cartel to manipulate
oil prices. Other nations can and often do cooperate
with OPEC policies. However, some OPEC members
or others might undercut prices to expand their market
share. Exporting countries can influence the market in
several ways. If oil prices rise, then these countries may
cut production, benefiting from the consequent higher
prices and also harboring oil reserves for the future.
Similarly, when oil prices fall, the state might order an
increase in oil production to compensate, using sales
volume to maintain oil revenue.
Our central concern in all these observations has
been to determine what happens to defense spending.
That is, if oil revenues fall, would defense spending
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decrease to a proportionate level, decrease more,
or decrease less? For many countries, decreases in
major GDP components would trigger demands for
reductions in discretionary government spending
such as defense outlays. If defense spending among
particular countries, like Iran or Venezuela, continues
to rise or the decrease in defense spending is not as
great as that of the oil revenue, then this behavior may
be a bad omen for the region or other nations that have
interests in that region. If defense expenditures appear
inelastic or insensitive to oil revenue, one needs to seek
other factors to explain such defense spending. Despite
oil revenues falling, defense spending may actually
increase, in which case neighboring countries need to
be wary.
With regard to Venezuela, Iran, Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and Nigeria, we shall examine in the next
section the oil revenue elasticity of defense spending,
using each country’s past 10 years of complete data to
measure behavior. Many developing countries do not
have a reliable means of gathering financial statistics.
Estimating the amount of oil revenue may thus be
difficult. Additionally, calculating defense spending
is a problematic art. How can an outside observer
measure expenditures or anticipated purchases
confidently? Several oil-exporting countries lack
transparency, meaning that ascertaining internal
budgetary and spending amounts may be pure
speculation. Determining the composition of defense
or security spending requires another complex and
problematic calculation. Police, dual-use infrastructure,
communications systems, and other entities that appear nonmilitary in nature could actually mask their
true use, thus further obscuring outlays that are in fact
part of defense spending.
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In the present case, our analysis relies on oil revenue
and defense spending data reported to OPEC and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The U.S. Energy
Information Administration also provides a reliable
source of data to back up the other two sources. The
study also compared its information to other sources
as a rough gauge of accuracy.15 The defense spending
calculations are based on yearly defense budgets.
These amounts provide a long-range view of a nation’s
spending plans or intentions that may include large
capital investments (e.g., jet aircraft or ballistic missiles)
or expansion of the labor supply that goes beyond
normal short-term fluctuations in oil prices. Defense
budgets allow governments to commit resources to
enact policies. Increasing a nation’s military capability
may require a huge chunk from current oil revenues or
foreign exchange earnings from past petroleum sales,
thus reducing resources for domestic use.
Export oil sales may not result in receipt of
foreign exchange, but instead goods, services, labor,
technology, or even political gain. Nations that sell oil
may also receive military goods from a buyer through
a barter arrangement. States may conclude long-term
oil contracts based on factors other than the price of
oil. The Soviet Union provided weapon systems, oil,
and finished goods in exchange for sugar at artificially
high prices to support a faltering Cuban economy, thus
demonstrating its political and military support for a
nation under U.S. economic sanctions. The trade for
sugar provided a veil of legitimacy for this exchange.
Despite variable world sugar prices, Havana could
count on stable resources from Moscow to fund its
military activities.
Oil revenue does provide a means to purchase
weapon systems and fund security forces to protect
a country from external and internal threats. Protect20

ing national sovereignty is a paramount interest.
If a government faces an external threat, then it
might very well increase defense spending despite
its inability to find sufficient oil or other revenues
to pay for the defence increase. However, such
countries could use their potential oil revenues
as a means to pay for these expenditures through
the sale of future leaseholds, negotiating longterm purchase agreements for weapons, or using foreign exchange reserves from prior oil sales for weapons
and military programs. Governments could also defer
social welfare payments and break the implied contract
with its citizens to provide a satisfactory level of services
in exchange for public acceptance of the current form
of governance. State-supplied incomes or subsidized
employment might end, with the government forcing
its citizenry and businesses to pay increased taxes.
The rise of defense spending could then become a
way to deter the external threat and perhaps forcibly
consolidate the government’s power and position after
the social contract fractures.
States may use oil revenues as an instrument to
achieve foreign and domestic interests in still other
ways, e.g., employ oil revenue to fund opponents of
a threatening foe, combat internal dissent through
greater social welfare programs, providing payments
to the threatening nation to avoid conflict, and other
such actions. The government could also suspend overt
spending for defense or security programs and divert
the money into covert defense channels, thus disguising
its true nature. Transparent defense spending is only
one approach.
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HOW DO OIL REVENUES AFFECT DEFENSE
SPENDING?
All five of the nations studied have compelling
reasons to maintain a strong defense and security
apparatus due to internal or external threats. These
nations all have large income-producing oil export
sectors. Additionally, each nation is an OPEC
member. They have relatively large military spending
commitments compared to their neighbors. These
nations have been selling oil for several years and will
continue to do so well into the future.
The five country cases demonstrate only a limited
degree of responsiveness to oil revenue changes
relative to defense spending from 1997 to 2007. All of
the countries reflect an inelastic relationship between
oil revenues and defense spending (see Table 1). During
periods when large reductions in oil revenues occurred,
the governments either increased their defense
spending or at least slowed their defense spending at a
lesser rate than that of the fall in oil revenue. In many
cases, oil revenue and defense spending demonstrated
a negative relationship, with the nations suffering
falling oil revenues. Similarly, on occasions where
oil revenues increased, defense spending usually
increased at a higher percentage rate than the rise in
oil sales. In both situations, the governments appeared
to shelter defense spending from the adverse economic
conditions facing the nation. This might indicate that
oil revenues are the main determinant of the scale
of defense spending, but current or past defense
spending is not a good forecasting tool to tell how
the nation will use its oil wealth in all conditions. A
broader understanding of each nation’s interests could
explain the motivations to increase or decrease defense
budgets.
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Nation

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Iran

IN

IN

IN

IN

IN

IN

IN

E

IN

E

E

Saudi
Arabia

IN

IN

IN

IN

IN

IN

IN

IN

IN

U

E

Kuwait

IN

U

IN

IN

IN

IN

IN

IN

IN

IN

IN

Venezuela

IN

IN

IN

IN

IN

E

IN

IN

IN

IN

E

Nigeria

IN

IN

IN

IN

IN

E

IN

IN

E

IN

E

IN -Inelastic
E-Elastic
U-Unitary (i.e., rate of change for oil revenues = rate of change for defense spending)

Table 1. Oil Revenue Elasticity of Defense Budget
Measures.
For example, some countries might base budget
decisions on past economic performance. But bureaucratic processes and economic performance measures
might not always coincide sufficiently to help government officials determine the proper parameters for a
budget. In one source consulted for this monograph,
elasticity calculations for oil revenues seemed to lag
defense budgets by a year, in which case governments
could consider past oil revenue sales for current
defense budgets. The results largely reflected the same
inelastic nature of the original calculations. Nations
were still reluctant to reduce defense spending at the
same rate as oil revenue reductions after at least a year
of declining oil revenues.
Each nation experienced periods when defense
spending was unaffected by its export oil sales. Military
budgets remained at or near the same levels as previous
periods. However, several countries had increasing
defense budgets regardless of any oil revenue increase
or decrease. Oil revenues and defense spending had
a negative relationship. Defense spending increased
while oil revenues fell. During the study period, the
world saw oil prices increase, which would indicate
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a long-term rise in incomes for the five countries. In
nominal terms, spot crude oil prices jumped from
$14.36 per barrel in 1998 to $91.69 by the end of 2007.
Oil prices, adjusted for inflation, almost quadrupled
from 1998 to 2007. In 2000 and 2001, the world economy
did suffer from a softening of consumer demand. The
dot.com bust of imploding information technology
firms and global downturn did reduce the demand for
goods and services, including imported oil. Despite
these downturns, oil-exporting countries kept their
focus on the long term and saw a bright future selling
their wares that may have influenced their decision
to maintain their defense budgets at pre-bust levels.
OPEC countries could look to nations like India and
China, who would continue to demand more crude oil
to fuel their emerging industry and consumer needs.
Chinese energy demand has tripled since 1980,
approaching the U.S. level of consumption.16 China’s
economy continues to be an energy-intensive one
that requires more oil to produce one dollar of GDP
relative to other comparable industrialized countries.
In 2002, for example, China required 0.23 kilograms of
oil to make a product that in lower- or middle-income
industrialized countries would take only 0.15 to 0.25
kilograms for the equivalent product.17 China’s exportdriven economy, consumer demand for petroleum,
pollution concerns from reliance on coal, attempts to
switch to other energy sources, and energy inefficiency
will help ensure a robust Chinese market for oilexporting nations, thus assuring their ability to expand
defense budgets.
Rising prices and increased demand for energy
provide oil producers several opportunities and
challenges. Reliance on foreign energy sources by
other nations creates a steady stream of oil business
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today and into the future. Foreign dependence allows
oil exporters to demand and get increased prices,
whether due to limited supply or increased demand.
This revenue allows the producer nation to fund
numerous essential programs. Not only does the
enhanced income fund defense programs, but it also
allows for a wider expansion of programs to ensure
that the government upholds the nation’s social welfare
contract that tends to dispel public discontent with
the government. But greater wealth may also bring
increased demand for a sharing of resources among
the population. Along with these demands, the public
might look for greater transparency and a greater voice
in the political process, demands that the government
may oppose. Populations which are accustomed to
improving standards of living during these times of
prosperity may become passively compliant in the face
of their government’s actions, but during times of oil
price decreases could come to question government
decisionmaking and demand a greater part in national
policy determination.
Reliance on oil or other valuable natural resources
can provide an avenue leading to future economic
riches. How the nation spends and distributes
its wealth may well determine how it develops
economically and politically. These decisions will also
shape spending enabled by future oil exports as well.
Authoritarian governments of small nations with few
democratic institutions may use their oil wealth to
ensure their continued survival in power at the cost of
the public’s welfare and basic freedoms. Defense and
security spending become the main objective to retain
control, and the government must ensure funding
for this function regardless of economic conditions.
Governments that could have used oil revenue for
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economic development and diversification might have
found those to be a better solution for reducing public
clamor for improved standards of living—far better
than expanding their military capability to repress the
clamor.
But governments of oil-exporting nations have
other, often overriding, reasons to spend their wealth
for defense and security. Many of these reasons do not
involve the level of oil revenues. Bureaucratic politics,
careerism, partisan advocacy, and other factors may
cloud decisionmaking in the process. Oil prices and
thus revenue can increase or decrease, with defense
spending mimicking the rise and fall of such revenues.
In this monograph, some of the largest oil-exporting
nations were not constrained by decreased oil revenues.
On the contrary, defense spending frequently increased
while oil revenue fell. In some cases, oil revenue rose,
yet the rate of defense spending rose even faster. Some
of the reasons appear to be bureaucratic. Procurement
activities require extended funding, such as aircraft
purchases. Other reasons include using oil revenue
to secure good relationships with other nations and
developing an industrial base. Finally, a number of
countries face severe security threats, internal and
domestic, such that the country must continue to
rely on a high level of defense spending to thwart an
actual threat to the nation. Let us turn now to our five
individual cases.
Saudi Arabia.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the world’s leading
oil-producing country and possesses the largest proven
oil reserves. Saudi Arabia also has the largest defense
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budget of all five countries studied. The government
has control over its oil reserves in terms of ownership
of the natural resources, state-owned enterprises that
operate the extraction equipment, and oil drilling lease
rights. The Saudi delegation frequently dominates
OPEC oil price and production determination meetings
that guide oil market direction. Saudi Arabia also has
the biggest GDP of all other nations in the region, and
has enjoyed years of significant oil exports to accrue
sizable foreign earnings and investments. Given the
Kingdom’s wealth and earning ability, defense budgets
have increased in the last 4 years of the study (2003-07)
by an average of 17.35 percentage points per year.
Oil revenues accounted for 26 percent of the Saudi
government’s budget. Greater wealth has also brought
a rising standard of living among Saudi citizens.
Although the government provides some jobs, income
distribution appears skewed among the population.
Some citizens have questioned future employment
prospects and the lack of employment opportunity
due to a largely oil export-dominated economy. If
citizens are not supported by government positions,
the monarchy, or the petroleum industry, then there
are few opportunities for viable careers. Discontent
among some Saudi citizens has led to a rise in distrust
of the Saudi government. Some government critics
have linked these conditions to the rise of radical
Islamic factions and potential complicity of Saudi
citizens in the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks.18 The
Saudi government response has been to crack down on
extremist groups, limit certain forms of civil expression,
and strengthen a number of internal security measures.
The Kingdom has suffered several suicide bombings,
attacks on oil production infrastructure, and kidnappings by terrorists. Faced with potential internal
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threats from radical militants and an external rival
like Iran, the government needs a large and modern
defense and security apparatus. Oil revenues provide a
means to fund programs that support these measures.
Additionally, oil and defense provide a secure base of
employment. Increased defense spending allows the
government to fund a politically secure national guard
that supports the government, provides security and
jobs, and may reduce the demands by certain groups
who seek change within the government.
Saudi Arabia has used its oil wealth to fund defense
and educational programs. During the mid-2000s,
Riyadh increased spending on education to improve the
technical skills of the population so as to counterbalance
the influence of radical religious schools.19 Increased
education could offset some of the effects of extremist
religious thinking. The government has focused an
increasing effort towards enhancing the public’s
technical training and basic skills. Higher education
may pose some difficulties. An educated public, with
access to foreign ideas and concepts regarding greater
transparency and governance, may someday create
a more difficult problem for governments to combat
than an external security threat. A greater population
of educated individuals may spawn greater demand
for the freedoms and cultural norms of the West.
Calls for greater government restrictions on debate
of national policy can encourage radical elements of
society to voice and act upon their discontent. These
acts may create more internal security concerns than
any external threat. However, Saudi Arabia still faces
many potential security issues from outside their
borders.
One of the major external security threats to Saudi
Arabia comes from Iran. The Islamic Republic of Iran is
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a growing military, regional, political, economic, and
religious rival to Saudi Arabia. After the fall of Saddam
Hussein, Iran benefited from a weakened Iraq that
no longer offers a direct physical threat or possesses
the capability to spread Iraqi influence in the region.
Iran now has on its western border this weakened
enemy that is trying to rebuild itself despite great
civil unrest. Tehran has aided Shiite factions opposed
to reconciliation efforts by the Iraqi government.
If successful, Iran’s supporters in Iraq could come
to dominate the Baghdad government and allow
Tehran’s influence to sweep across the area and pose a
real threat to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, one of the
leaders in the region and the Arab world. Iran’s drive to
build nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology
provides a means to strike not only Israel, but also
other Middle Eastern cities. Iranian efforts to launch a
satellite into orbit and continued test launches provide
ample evidence of its ability to develop its ballistic
missile capability. Despite threats of sanctions, the
Iranian government continues to make major weapons
purchases. An Iranian military that came to dominate
the Persian Gulf could also threaten oil deliveries not
only by Saudi Arabia, but also other Gulf states.
Iran also challenges the Saudi Arabian government
in other ways that have security implications. An
ideological conflict between the two nations for influence in the Middle East has widened. Iran has dabbled
in the Palestinian and Lebanon issues, led a chorus
of anti-American rhetoric, confronted Israel, and
pursued other actions to demonstrate its leadership in
the pan-Arabic world. The Iranian government called
for the overthrow of Sunni monarchies, like Saudi
Arabia and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, in 1979.20 Iran’s
ability to sell oil at a price and volume that ignores
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OPEC quotas represents another challenge to Saudi
Arabia’s leadership. A rising militant Iran can threaten
the existence of the current Saudi government in many
ways, especially militarily.
Although Saudi Arabia outspends Iran on defense, Iran’s military, in terms of personnel, outweighs
Riyadh’s military forces. The Saudi Arabian
government has substituted costly technology for
large fielded forces due to its small population and
great geographic size. Aircraft, military vehicles, naval
vessels, and other capital investments dominate Saudi
acquisitions; these purchases represent long-term
investments that require a commitment of decades.
One analyst reviewing Saudi defense budgets noted
that the government’s security needs far outweigh
any adverse impact on the annual national budget.21
Because of Iran, and also potential terrorist attacks, the
Saudi government will provide security in the country
regardless of the oil revenue level.
Iran.
Iran’s ability to supply oil provides resources
to fund weapons development and supports the
government’s ability to challenge the United States
politically in the region.22 Exporting oil serves several
purposes. First, it provides a stream of income to
support governmental operations. This includes
funding for military and security activities. Second,
selling oil to nations that have severe energy concerns
might woo them to embrace Iran’s side in its conflict
with the United States. Countries that receive Iranian
oil may be less willing to support American-led efforts
for sanctions or other actions against Tehran. Third,
Iran could deliver oil to states that are already under
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sanctions or other international restrictions, such
as North Korea. This would serve to sustain antiAmerican states capable of distracting Washington,
while Iran continues unfettered to pursue its own
foreign and domestic policy interests.
Tehran’s use of oil as a weapon has been quite
innovative. Iran has used its oil revenues to underwrite
military operations and build a military capable of
threatening its regional neighbors, including Israel
and American military bases. These efforts include
purchasing military and nuclear technology from
Russia, China, Pakistan, and North Korea. Iran’s drive
for nuclear weapons has been a vital program in the
country’s national security strategy. Its effort to produce nuclear weapons and a delivery system requires a
large and constant inflow of revenue. Additionally, Iran
has attempted to use oil as a political weapon. Tehran
has reduced oil exports to those states supporting
sanctions for nuclear fuel violations.23 Iran’s threats
to cut oil also provide a potential economic weapon
against oil importers. If Iran slashed its petroleum
exports, then world oil markets would panic with an
accompanying steep rise in prices. Similarly, under
conditions of oil excesses, large oil exporters like Iran
can afford to sell petroleum at relatively low prices
and use its ability to increase sales volume to make up
the difference. Iran can also threaten to shut down the
Strait of Hormuz or conduct combat operations in the
area, much as it did in its war with Iraq in the 1980s,
which would cause disruption of oil supplies and
increase oil prices. The result of these actions could
destabilize Western economies.
Iran, like Saudi Arabia, relies heavily on oil exports.24
Approximately 70 percent of the government’s
operating revenue comes from oil sales.25 Although the

31

sales volume is less than half of Saudi Arabia’s, the level
of revenue is enormous. The bulk of its available trade
earnings go to support a defense budget. However,
Iran’s restrictive government control of economic and
financial activities has hurt domestic business.
Tehran directs and is responsible for financing
much of the economic growth in the nation, with its
heavy reliance on oil revenues for defense, making
defense more elastic than other nations. Iran’s large
population and limited economic growth potential
have created major problems with unemployment
and underemployment among its youth. Government
restrictions on severance, wages, and other labor
practices make hiring new employees difficult. Young
adults with college educations find career opportunities limited. Although Iran exports oil and natural
gas, it requires increasing domestic energy supplies
for its own population. An additional source is nuclear
energy. Iran can fund its nuclear energy programs and
simultaneously continue its efforts to build nuclear
weapons. This effort appears to be the government’s
highest priority in 2009.26 Such maxed-out economic
commitments place a constraint on Iran’s freedom of
action.
Iran’s oil supply gives Tehran an extra advantage
that it can use to advance its military expansion. Quid
pro quo agreements to exchange oil for weapons
technology or systems, especially to energy-starved
countries, gives Iran especially useful leverage. This
leverage can be employed to acquire capabilities and
influence from countries that do not have sufficient
foreign exchange or nonmilitary tradable goods or
services to purchase oil. In recent years, the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) has been a major exporter
of goods to Tehran and importer of Iranian oil. This
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trade provides an avenue to exchange technology,
goods, and services between nations that might have a
common goal of thwarting U.S. influence in the Middle
East and other areas. But the reliance on oil trading is
also a limitation to Iran’s power. If Tehran shuts down
the Strait of Hormuz, creates a war zone of the Persian
Gulf, or makes a military or economic target of it, then
it will severely limit its ability to sell its oil to its friends
or the free market. The Iranian government can create
problems for the United States, but it must carefully
weigh its options and avoid situations that would
include the destruction or damage of its own economic
means to achieve its national interests.
Kuwait.
To explain Kuwait’s oil revenues and defense
spending, we confront a set of circumstances different
than those of the other Middle Eastern countries.
“Defense spending,” as used here, includes economic
development.
In August 1990, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait.
The Kuwaiti government needed the United States
and many coalition partners to liberate the country
from Iraq. Today, the Iraqi government offers little
threat to Kuwait. However, an Iraqi civil war could
create severe security conditions along the border. An
ascending Iran could also flex its military muscles by
threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz and attempt
to create a regional hegemony. Terrorists could
attempt to destroy the Kuwaiti monarchy. Iran could
also attempt to seize Kuwaiti territories.
The nation has spent much of its oil revenues
diversifying its economy. The government has
developed economic trade zones to lure business
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from Asia, Europe, and other areas. A new economic
trade hub, Silk City, will cost an estimated $75 billion
to complete.27 Increased trade and commerce may
require additional security to assure companies and
financial institutions that their investments are safe.
Defense spending can provide a visible demonstration
of Kuwait’s assurance of security. Defense spending
is also a means to develop the economy. Some
countries, like Kuwait’s neighbor, the United Arab
Emirates (UAE), also use defense spending as a means
to improve domestic job skills by requiring foreign
defense contractors to use the local industrial base for
labor, components, and assembly.28
The composition of Kuwaiti defense spending
determines the size and character of the budget.
Increased Kuwaiti defense spending serves to
compensate for the small size of the armed forces. The
total Kuwaiti active force is about 15,500 personnel,
with another 23,700 reservists. This small force could
not withstand a serious attack by Iran. The Iranian
active forces number over one-half million personnel
with a reserve force of 350,000. The Kuwaiti Ministry
of Defence tries to compensate for the personnel
disparity through the purchase of advanced weaponry.
Kuwaiti defense forces aim to meet such enemy threats
with technology entailing extensive and expensive
acquisitions. For example, a missile defense system is
required to defeat an Iranian ballistic missile. In 2007,
Kuwait purchased 80 advanced Patriot-3 missiles
plus upgrade kits for existing older generation Patriot
missiles.29 These systems could defend the country’s
airspace and provide a limited shield against a ballistic
missile attack. Kuwait also recently purchased the
French Rafale fighter, naval frigates, and additional
anti-missile defense systems.30 Other purchases
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include tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided
(TOW) anti-tank missiles to replace older versions of
the existing system. Kuwait has also sought bilateral
defense cooperation agreements with a number of
countries, to include Turkey, which may aid it in a
time of national emergency. Kuwait’s purchase of
weapons from large western nations also solidifies
international support during a crisis, improves its
ability to use modern weapons technology to offset its
numerical disadvantages, provides for an opportunity
to expand a growing industrial base, and, by sacrificing
its oil revenue, demonstrates its determination to resist
regional threats.
Kuwait also has stressed defense cooperation
with many of its Persian Gulf neighbors. In August
1990, many small Gulf states and Saudi Arabia joined
the U.S.-sponsored alliance to restore Kuwait after
its invasion by Iraq. This alliance also sent troops to
Kuwait in 2003 just before the U.S. invasion of Iraq.
A protective military force of over 8,000 from Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and the UAE deployed
to Kuwait.31 High defense spending will probably
continue, despite weakened oil sales, due to Kuwait’s
fear that its sovereignty is in jeopardy.
Venezuela.
Venezuela has benefited greatly from its natural
resources. Its windfall oil profits deriving from
worldwide economic growth and energy demand have
allowed Caracas to fund many government programs
and activities. Venezuelan oil became a powerful
means for President Chavez to underwrite a host of
programs to secure populist support. These programs
included expanded infrastructure plus social and
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economic programs. The Venezuelan government has
also attempted to limit American influence in Central
and Latin America. Despite tensions between the two
countries, Venezuela continues to be one of the largest
oil exporters to the United States. Caracas has used its
oil revenues to expand its military capabilities; support
anti-American candidates, causes, and parties that are
close to its ideological base; purchase weapons from
Russia and China to demonstrate its independence
from Washington; support Cuba; and assist movements
to destabilize and replace governments in the region.
Caracas fears external and internal foes that appear
to threaten the government. Chavez has accused the
United States of meddling in its internal affairs on
several occasions, including support for a military
coup attempt in 2002 and earlier. After the coup
attempt, which removed Chavez from power for 24
hours, the Venezuelan government replaced several
military leaders, and the government clamped down
on political dissent. He continued his anti-American
rant, culminating in the forced removal of the U.S.
ambassador to Venezuela in September 2008. Chavez
had accused Washington of planning another plot
for his overthrow by Venezuelan military officers.32
Chavez has continued to make demogogic claims
about American-led efforts to unseat or disrupt his
government since his rise to power in 1998.
The country has also suffered internal problems,
including several labor strikes, worker and consumer
boycotts, complaints about lack of political freedoms,
and protests over state seizures of businesses. Chavez
nationalized the private oil industry and replaced
many experienced oil and management workers
because of their opposition to this seizure. With veteran
workers gone and reduced capital expenditures in
infrastructure, Venezuela’s oil production has fallen.
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Oil revenues increased, but only because of oil price
increases. Continued loss of private industry to the
state and adoption of a Cuba-styled economy will
create more discontent among the business and middle
classes. This state of affairs has provided a rationale for
supplying more funds for defense and security so as to
quell domestic dissent and foster nationalistic fervor
for his Bolivarian revolution against an external foe,
the United States.
President Chavez has successfully used wealth
from oil revenue to fund an extensive social welfare
and jobs program to secure populist support. In
February 2009, Chavez was able to overturn efforts
by opponents to place term limits on the presidency.
This election will allow him to run for president again
after his current 6-year term in office ends in 2013.
Chavez has used subsidized food, free health care,
government jobs, inexpensive subsidized gasoline
(at approximately 10 cents per gallon), and other oil
revenue-funded programs to secure public support.33
Oil processing slid in 2009, reducing oil revenues. If
oil prices fall, Chavez’s ability to provide funds to pay
for social spending will weaken, perhaps increasing
domestic opposition. President Chavez may face real
difficulties in continuing these subsidies. Despite
the reduction in oil revenues in 2009, Chavez has
expanded the Venezuelan military. He has complained
about neighboring Colombia granting basing rights to
Washington. In turn, Bogota claims that Caracas has
supplied arms to the macro-terrorist Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia. Such claims and
counterclaims have fueled tensions across the border.
The Venezuelan military will expand to include militia
groups, new riverine forces, reserve unit conversions
to combat battalions, and doubling the armored forces.
On July 28, 2009, Chavez signed a deal with Russia to
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purchase T-72M tanks and 2S25 self-propelled antitank guns.34
Chavez requires a strong security force. It must
demonstrate to a domestic and regional audience an
ability to defend Venezuela’s sovereignty against
an American invasion; provide aid to Colombian
guerrillas; extend support to regional socialist and
revolutionary groups and governments; ensure
domestic security and combat internal opposition; and
maintain loyalty among its members. Spending on
military weapons acquisition programs from Russia
and other nations demonstrates some independence
from the United States and provides a means to extend
Venezuela’s image and legitimacy as a growing socialist
state. Increased defense spending also provides assets
to support a number of political movements within
Central and Latin America that are sympathetic to
Chavez or that might emulate his government as a
model.35
If Chavez wants the capability to defend the
Venezuelan government against potential coup
attempts, then he must maintain generous spending on
defense or security. He must extend defense spending
regardless of oil price changes and their effect on
revenues. This might explain the inelastic relation of oil
revenues to defense spending in Venezuela. Although
Chavez has threatened to stop oil sales to the United
States, his policy has in fact been to continue them.
Venezuela is normally among the top 10 oil exporters
in the world and was the fourth largest oil exporter
to the United States in 2008. Continued threats to
reduce oil sales appear to be hollow, given the mutual
dependency that Venezuela shares with the United
States. Ironically, as the Caracas government continues
to spew anti-American rhetoric about Washington’s
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alleged interference in Venezuelan and Latin American
affairs and threatens to sever oil sales, the U.S. market
continues to expand. The U.S. oil market, in fact, offers
Chavez the means to continue his programs.
The Venezuelan government has tied its foreign
and domestic interests to the U.S. addiction to oil.
Venezuela produces heavy crude. This type of oil
contains more impurities than Saudi Arabian “sweet
light,” requiring more intensive refinement by U.S.
buyers. These special refineries are more expensive to
operate, and this requirement has reduced the selling
price for Venezuelan oil. The Chavez government
has also invested heavily in such refineries and has
established a large distribution system under the
CITGO brand. Alienating Washington may create
situations where Venezuelan assets are vulnerable to
sanctions or other limits on their operation.
Like Iran, Venezuela’s ambitions are somewhat
curbed by its dependence on selling oil. Venezuela’s
reliance on American markets to purchase its heavy
crude can limit options that Chavez might take to harm
American interests, particulary economic interests.
Nigeria.
Nigeria is rapidly becoming one of the world’s
leading oil producers. Washington has great interest in
the Nigerian government’s political stability since this
West African nation exports about 20 percent of the total
of U.S. oil imports. World energy demand has made
Nigeria, a country with the second largest proven oil
reserves in Africa, fertile ground for exploration in the
Niger Delta and the Gulf of Guinea. Nigeria contains
the largest African natural gas reserves. Petroleum
exports provide up to 95 percent of its export earnings
and 85 percent of its government revenues.36
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Oil has provided an economic boon for the
government. However, not all of Nigeria’s population
has benefited from this wealth. Oil industry plant and
operations have displaced many residents in the Niger
Delta and have altered the environment. Corrupt
government officials and misplaced policies have
destroyed the social and economic coherency of the
Niger Delta inhabitants’ lifestyles. The government
has seized land from residents for oil exploration.
Pollution has destroyed fisheries and agricultural
lands. Economic returns from oil have largely
bypassed these residents, reaching only the hands of
the government and the wealthy. These trends have
created a recipe for insurgency, leading to large
areas of instability within the delta.37 Insurgents have
seized property, damaged oil pipelines, and attacked
government forces. These activities have threatened the
security of oil exploration and have limited economic
development within the region.
Nigeria has experienced significant tribal differences that led to civil war. Tribal differences frequently
transcend political borders. Nearby Liberia, Côte
d’Ivorie, and Sierra Leone have had coups, civil war,
and tribal warfare. Nigeria has witnessed election fraud,
civil war, coups, growing schism between Muslim
and Christian factions, political corruption, crime,
and border disputes. Military-led coups have strained
relations among the civil government, the public, and
military members. The Nigerian government must
contend with a number of diverse security issues that
require defense spending regardless of the size of oil
revenue.
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CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Oil is a powerful weapon with significant economic,
industrial, and military impacts. Countries that control
oil or other limited key natural resources appear
to have a great advantage over import-dependent
nations. International sales of such resources not only
provide wealth to the owners, but can also generate
significant influence over buyers. Oil wealth provides
the means to finance the wherewithal for a country
to realize and protect its national interests. Exporters
can negotiate agreements with potential importers for
obtaining political support or brokering various forms
of compensation. During times when a resource is in
high demand, exporting nations appear to have the
capacity to expand their defense capability owing to
enhanced revenues.
Policymakers who reach a single solution in
understanding the dynamic relation between oil
revenues on the one hand, and defense spending on the
other, may be oversimplifying the situation. Observers
may make the correlation that the level of oil revenue drives defense budgets. Generally, increased oil
revenues do result in higher defense budgets. Logically, in some people’s minds the converse must also be
true. Falling oil prices will force reductions in defense
spending. Poor economic times and reductions
in oil demand will limit the ability of countries to
increase their military capabilities and lessen the
threat to their neighbors, or so it is thought. Linkage
between oil revenue levels and levels of military
expenditures, however, appear weak, meaning that
attempts to limit defense spending by tinkering
with a producer’s oil revenues are likely to fail.
Perhaps first evaluating the root cause of the impulse
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of nations to expand their military force structure and
capabilities—and then acting on that root cause—may
be a better alternative than direct attempts to limit
defense expenditures by these nations. Domestic and
foreign rationales for boosting defense spending might
address the issues quicker and more effectively for the
United States. Diplomatic, political, and informational
tools could focus on calls for internal reforms that
could reduce tensions between governments and their
publics. Diffusing regional rivalries can also reduce
tensions that might stop an arms race, especially a race
that involves nuclear weapons. Long-term economic
development and the weaning away of states from
sole reliance on natural mineral extraction could also
diversify the economies and broaden opportunities for
these nations.
Policies to limit oil revenues in particular countries
so as to ensure a reduction in defense spending may
do more harm than good. Disrupting the free flow
of oil may cause economic disruptions at home and
abroad. Perturbations of oil imports will probably
induce traders to speculate even more feverishly on
future supplies. This will raise the world oil prices
that will in turn create economic disruptions and
possibly even increase revenues to the very countries
targeted by the policy. Unfortunately, oil importers
have few legitimate options to curb oil exports and
prices controlled by sellers, especially during times
of limited global oil supply. Forcing oil exports may
artificially pit Washington against other oil importers.
Reducing defense expenditures in certain regions may
help the common good of nations in a very general
sense. But we should constantly remind ourselves that
in cases where oil revenue did shrink, defense budgets
increased or decreased at a lower rate than the fall in
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revenues. Perhaps future study of oil price growth,
long-term contracts, a regional threat, etc., will be
able to explain the persistent strength of maintaining
defense spending.
A more prudent option is to evaluate each
individual case to determine why defense spending
seems entrenched in certain countries. A particular
country may have a perfectly legitimate reason to
maintain large defense expenditures. Fear of attack
or an internal insurgency from many foes may be at
the core of the issue. In this case, the United States and
regional allies may try to support the nation. Increased
defense expenditures could also be a signal that the
nation’s government feels that the United States is not
willing to do more or that the nation’s government
does not desire the public perception of accepting aid
from Washington.
Countries that spend oil revenues to acquire the
means to threaten neighbors or others outside their
region, such as ballistic missiles with a WMD, may
necessitate a concerted effort on the part of western
nations to stem their efforts. Gaining international
agreement to limit access to technology and critical
components may be more effective than unilateral
actions. The need for oil may force many nations to
choose between support for international sanctions
and their own self-interest. Washington’s ability to
secure solid agreement and cooperation for any policy
that sanctions a targeted nation depends on broad
mutuality of interests.
Thus, before the U.S. Government implements
policies that attempt to restrict an oil exporter’s ability
to sell oil, there are many factors to consider. Certain
conditions may nullify the apparent advantage that
oil exporters appear to possess. These countries may
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have an upper hand in owning oil resources, but
without a buyer of their product, they too may suffer.
For example, as we have seen, Venezuela makes many
threats to halt oil sales to the United States, yet the
United States continues to be the largest consumer of
Caracas’ oil exports. If Venezuela ceases petroleum
sales to America, then it will cripple its ability to raise
foreign exchange. Almost all exporting nations must
ensure the free flow of oil over the long term, unless
they have made careful preparations for weathering
their threatened boycott or have stockpiled foreign
exchange to compensate for their withdrawal from
the market. An unquenched thirst for oil revenue
that guarantees a flow of foreign exchange to fund
military budgets or maintain their citizens’ standard
of living forces oil exporters to do business with
enemies. Even if the oil-exporting country limits
business with an enemy, oil traders frequently resell
or process oil from many oil producers, thus making
traceability problematic. High oil prices may also spur
importing nations to implement policies to reduce
their dependence on foreign energy.
This call for long-term changes, if successful, could
seriously erode the ability of oil-exporting countries to
maintain their social contract with their publics into the
future. Oil-producing nations must also recognize that
if the price of petroleum becomes too high, then a global
recession may result. In that case, oil purchases may
be reduced, foreign investments may depreciate, the
domestic oil industry may face decline, and alternative
energy sources may become economically competitive.
Such consequences could create significant domestic
discord.
In each of the five nations we have examined, the
wealth generated by oil sales also has sown seeds of
discontent. One option the United States and other
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nations can implement is to improve universal access
to information. Authoritarian regimes that want to
challenge American interests or thwart its regional
goals may face a more significant challenge to their
government, i.e., internal discontent. In a rapidly
changing era of information, despite controls by
governments, great wealth and its distribution become
the subject of public policy debate. Populations, despite
controls, can gather information from the internet,
global news media, study abroad, or travel financed
by oil revenue. Citizen dissenters demanding greater
transparency for governance, advancement of human
rights, and cultural liberalization in the country can
provide a focus for organizing disparate groups. A free
flow of information can also allow dissenters to compare the standards of living and ways other governments solve public policy issues with their citizens.
The United States and other nations may need only to
provide current, accurate, and unbiased information
within the oil-exporting country. Despite efforts to
control the internet and information, authoritarian
governments like the PRC, Iran and others cannot
completely limit access to all information.
Depending on the country, purchasing military
equipment may not be a bad transaction for oil importers and may be a policy to pursue. Selling raw materials
to gain foreign exchange to purchase finished defense
goods or services costs the oil-exporting countries
much national treasure. Countries that produce jet
fighters, anti-tank weapons, and similar expensive
products provide extensive value-added labor and
technology to transform raw materials into a product.
Oil exporters pay for these efforts, but frequently they
earn the foreign exchange by selling limited valueadded commodities (e.g., refined oil). Oil-importing
countries may even gain value by selling these defense
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products despite buying expensive oil. Oil-exporting
countries may need to increase the volume of their oil
sales, spend surplus foreign exchange, or attempt to
raise oil prices.
Limiting the oil revenues of certain countries to
reduce their defense spending may result in addressing
only symptoms and not the true reasons for large
defense budgets. Unlike a unified energy program
conducted by the U.S. Government, these state-specific
policies need to be tailored for unique conditions facing
a particular oil-exporting nation. A one-size-fits-all
policy would probably fail. Changing the behavior of
oil-exporting governments is a difficult task. Dealing
with governments with different rationales for retaining
large, inelastic defense spending will tax policymakers’
creativity. However, if the United States can reduce the
fear, of the oil-exporting nations, of an invasion by a
neighbor and restrain ambitions to threaten regional
rivals, then defense spending might fall and limit the
demand for high-cost, long-term defense acquisitions.
Of course, replacing a government that is used to
receiving, distributing, and controlling royalties may
take even longer than to persuade it to share power
with its public, create a more transparent process of
determining resource allocation, or reduce corruption
or cronyism.
Washington has a variety of options to influence
both governments and international audiences. If
nations fear an arms race between neighbors, then
Washington could sponsor arms reduction talks and
offer diplomatic solutions, guarantee security by
stationing military forces nearby to stabilize areas,
elevate the problem to a higher international body for
consideration, etc. Government policy should not center
on undifferentiated policies built on the assumption
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that all producers act in exactly the same manner or are
motivated in the same way. Attempting to characterize
and model a nation’s leadership behavior may thus be
far more difficult than previously thought.
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